Sooo... this discussion has not gone well up to this point. I'll leave it that at that.

I realize math is concrete. I believe statistics often times are interpretive. The further you venture down the road of variables the more convoluted results become. I don't argue math... I do argue the merit of used and discarded variables.

Yet, I value analytics. I think there will come a day that they rule league wide. I also believe they aren't iron clad enough in their current state. I try to be an educated fan and I'm well aware I do not know baseball. I've put my time in other sports. Some of you, especially the analytics crowd have put your time in baseball. You know more here. I'll admit it. That doesn't stop me from seeing issues with a way of thought... or stop me from questioning why.

The only part of analytics I want to discuss is run generation. I belong to neither school of thought.

I'm under the impression that the numbers used by analytics folks do not take into account the situation as it applies to the current game. IE: low scoring/high scoring tied, down 1 or up 10... all occurances lumped together. Statistics in a vacuum. Season(s) seen as 1 event where numbers hold true.

1...Is that true? If so, why do analytics people assume there are no quantifiable variations in regard to game situation?

I've heard often that the bunt success rate is terrible. Heard many conflicting numbers. I hear constantly... well hes a bad bunter so bunting him is bad.

2... Are there any stats (preferably without pitchers included) that show bunt success rate diminishing over the years? We have to assume bad and good bunters (position players) were used to bunt in old school baseball. Is there any proof stating bunters are league wide getting worse?

I also hear that the pitcher was nasty so getting a bunt down would be hard to do. While I understand and acknowledge that I wonder why no one brings up the fact that the nasty pitcher also makes it harder to hit.

3... Is there any proof that a power arm or nasty pitcher makes it harder to bunt beyond the point of equal correlation to the degree said pitcher makes it harder to hit?

I'm asking you to make sense of why these perceived holes in logic aren't a reality.
Thank you!

Ok so trying to piece this all together:

1: The stats we are looking at in regards to run expectancy and the likelihood of scoring does not factor in game score and inning. No variation assumed. I don't see how that can be assumed. We discuss leverage situations but don't think it effects scoring. Seems strange.

2: Baldkin thank you! Please understand the math I'm about to do will be crude. 49.6 fair bunts. As you stated that gives away a strike. Agreed and understood. But you can say by those numbers you'd expect 2 strikes to net you 74% chance of a fair bunt. I'll zero the potential of strike 3 for ease. Claims of 80% success sound asinine. Claims of 70% success sounds very optimistic. Pop bunts play in... bunts that get the lead runner mowed down exist. So i would suspect we are looking at numbers closer to 60% chance of moving the runner to 3rd... slightly lower chance of moving both runners to 2nd and 3rd. We don't know but that seems realistic to me. Fair? 60% seems awful... SEEMS awful.

3. Inconclusive at our level of knowledge. We have no idea if the pitcher has a greater effect on bunting success than the pitcher has on hitting success. We can assume... or not.. some might assume the elite pitcher has a greater downward effect on hitting than bunting. We simply dont know.

I can safely say that giving up an out lowers run expectancy. On the chart supplied by logan that holds true in ever single field across all recorded time. That isn't debatable. The only alteration to that is in the example BJ posted of the successful bunt and subsequent walk to set up the force. That gives back expectancy (and then some .104 runs increase over 1st 2nd no outs) but cuts the successful bunt gain from a 6.6% to a 4.7% increase in odds to score.

But in this case I don't care about run expectancy. 1.6 era... assuming all scores are solo (its not so numbers are better than this) he allows TB to tie the game 5 of 27 times. Win expectancy jumps from (roughly) 45% to above 81% (possibly as high as 85%) moving from zero runs to 1 run. That's significant enough that I dont care about runs beyond 1.

Bunting or giving up an out is always bad... for run expectancy. Fact... proven.
Bunting or giving up an out is always bad... in regards to likeihood to score... problem.

I've seen it multiple times. 60% x 67.6% = 40.5% (notice I'm using my lower successful bunt number)

That's easy to do. I also think moving one option a move down the road while leaving another option alone is disingenuous, not comparable and an oversight. Aren't we dealing with diminished returns? This is baseball afterall. 60% chance of a successful bunt. 60% of successful anything in baseball in regards to hitting is a gigantic number. With pina hitting you certainly have a chance he plates a run. You also leave a larger chance for a gidp on the table vs the bunt. (I dont know the % offset) That chance turns 61% chance to score into 25.7% in a flash. Is it likely... no(I assume, but an elite GO pitcher could certainly inflence it)... but its a viable percentage that has to be calculated in. Ks, shallow pop outs, force at 3rd are the same result as a failed bunt. Force at 1 same as successful bunt. Force at 2nd same as some bunt outcomes.

A 6.6% increase in the odds of scoring is making it 11% more likely that you score. A 4.7% increase (post ibb) makes it 7.7% more likely that you score. While swinging away gives you a chance to plate a run in that ab.. it also increases the likelihood that you will depreciate your chances of scoring in that inning. You simply can't adjust for the black and white outcome of the bunt without adjusting the outcome of the ab.

I believe the success rate of the AB will fail to match the success rate of the bunt. One has more upside and downside... one has more security. Once you move on to the broxton ab (or arcia ab post ibb) there are new and more plentiful options that plate a run which is reflected in the increase of likelihood to score despite the out with runners at 2nd and 3rd.

So I'm questioning the breakdown of the pina broxton arcia swing away abs... vs the breakdown of the pina bunt broxton and/or arcia (and batter in the hole) swing away ab.

Pina bunt is around 55% at 67.6%, 5%(?) at 63.4% (force at 2nd) 40% at 40.6%
Pina swing has some 100% some 67.6%... 63.4%...40.6% and 25.7%

Question 2... Does the swing away ab truly put the team in better scoring position or is it a push or near push with higher upside and drawbacks.

Until you can properly calculate that you can't say things like giving up an out is always wrong.

I do believe it is usually a bad idea to bunt. Run expectancy matters too much to give up outs in most cases. (Especially early) But I also believe this definitive talk of never is wrong. I also believe talk of only elite bunters followed by great hitters can push it into being a good choice is wrong. I believe remaining outs and the arms you can turn to can also flip that scenerio due to killing (kind of) the need for multiple runs. When mn bunted in the 7th with two bad bp arms in the holster a play for a 1 run lead didnt seem worth giving up the out. With knebel in the holster in a series where 7 runs were scored in 26 innings and 1 run in 26 innings by TB... 1 run looked far more imposing.

I'm certain our remedial look cant come close to it being a certainty... despite swimming in mountains of data i doubt that even the pro analytic groups can prove a statistical advantage. Too many factors variables filters to specify. Too many ways to paint the painting. Would love to see how deep down the rabbit hole they go though.

So the question is... bat by bat... where do the numbers land. 1st 2nd no out... pina bunt vs pina swing. Compare. You cant make an honest comparison without advancing both outcomes that ab.